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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------------------------SHELL OIL COMPANY,
Appellant,

vs.
BRINKERHOFF-SIGNAL DRILLING
COMPANY,

.
.
.
.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Case No. 18084

.

Respondent.
-------------------------~----------------------------------

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an indemnification action brought by Appellant,
Shell Oil Company, as a third-party action against Respondent,
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Company, for all damages which are
awarded to Respondent's employee, Billie Thomas Back, in his
personal injury claim against Appellant.
II.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The Fourth Judicial District Court granted Respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's

Third-Party

Complaint.
III.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment of the
District Court.

-1-
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IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

With the following additions, Respondent accepts Appellent's Statement of Facts:
1.

Plaintiff Back's Comp·laint against Appellant alleges

a cause of action for negligence based on Appellant's agent's
conduct at the accident site (R. 1-2) .
2.

Respondent has in every way complied with all of its

obligations as an employer under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-1 through 35-1-106 (1953, as
amended) , including securing compensation due Plaintiff Back
for the alleged injury (R. 52).
V.
I.

ARGUJ:.~ENT

INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS ARE DISFAVORED GENERALLY AND
SUBJECT TO STRICT CONSTRUCTION AGAINST THE NEGLIGENT
INDEMNITEE.
It has been long held by this Court that contracts

exempting persons from liability for negligence are contrary
to the public policy of inducing the exercise of due care.
In Jankele v. Texas Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425, 427
(1936), the Court stated: "It is very doubtful that defendant
could relieve itself by contract from its own negligence.
Ordinarily, such contracts are contrary to public policy."
Thereafter, the Court reasoned that the highest incentive to
the exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a failure to so act will fix liability for any resulting injury.
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Although Utah law does not prohibit the enforcement of
all indemnity agreements, case law has clearly demonstrated
Utah's difference in policy concerns from those cited in Appellant's Brief.

In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso

Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910, 913-14
(1965), this Court declared:
[T]he law does not look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve himself of the basic
duty which the law imposes on everyone: that of
using due care for the safety of himself and
others. This would tend to encourage carelessness and would not be salutary either for the
person seeking to protect himself or for those
whose safety may be hazzarded by his conduct.
For these reasons, such covenants are sometimes
declared invalid as being against public policy.
The general distaste of the Utah courts for indemnity
agreements is increased where an affirmative act of negligence
is involved.
207, 208

Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 P.2d

(1965).

In Howe Rents Corporation v. Worthen, 18

Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966), this Court set forth
the standard rule of construction wherein the drafter of an
indemnity provision which is to relieve him of liability for
his own negligence, should have, in case of doubt, the provision strictly construed against him.
This general judicial policy of disfavor toward indemnity agreements has been adopted by the Utah Legislature in
Utah Code Annotated §13-8-1 (1953, as amended).

Although not

strictly applicable to the facts of this case, instructive is

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the direction of the statute which prohibits a contractual provision as being against public policy and void when it purports
to indemnify a promisee against liability for da.raages arising
from the sole negligence of the promisee pursuant to a construction contract.
Paragraph 11.6 of the Master Rotary Drilling Contract
is an attempt by Appellant to contract away liability for its
own negligence in violation of the clear public policy of
Utah.

By way of this standard provision of its form contract,

Appellant is attempting to evade responsibility for its own
negligent conduct and that of its agents.

This is exactly the

elusive liability that the Court in Jankele feared.

If Appel-

lant can rely upon Paragraph 11.6 for its complete indemnity
for "all claims, demands, and causes of action" resulting from
personal or property injury to Respondent's employees, there
is no incentive for Appellant to exercise due care in its
operations.
In its Brief, Appellant relies heavily on cases from
numerous other jurisdictions for the proposition that indemnity
agreements "are valid and do not violate public policy."
N~vertheless,

although Respondent recognizes the impressive

list of citations in Appellant's Appendix I, it does not agree
with Appellant's conclusion.

Rather, Respondent asserts that

the Court need not go outside this jurisdiction to understand
that Utah law will offer an indernnitee protection only in
the rarest of circumstances.
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Assuming that in the absence of some consideration of public policy militating against it, one
may contract to protect himself against liability
for loss caused by his negligence, it is nevertheless well settled that contracts in which a
party attempts to do so are subject to strict
construction against him; and further, that he
will be afforded no protection unless the preclusion is clearly and unequivocally stated.
Walker Bank & Trust Company v. First Security Corporation,
9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944, 947 (1959).

The "majority rule"

referred to by Appellant is discussed in Union Pacific Railroad
Company v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 568 P.2d 724, 726
(1977) , was that there is a presumption against any intention
of the parties to form an agreement whereby a negligent party
would be indemnified from its own negligent acts.

Said pre-

sumption could be overcome only by a clear and unequivocal
indemnity obligation intended by the parties to cover the specifie set of circumstances.
Appellant's overstated argument is best illustrated by
its own attempt to parallel the subject indemnity provision
with a conunercial liability insurance policy.

An insurance

policy is drafted and sold by a company trained and licensed
specifically to offer such services.

Such companies are regula-

ted in Utah by the State Insurance Department to assure fair
practices and are the subjects of extensive legislation.
other hand, Respondent is a drilling company.

On the

The indemnity

provision at issue is but one subparagraph of a 28-page form
contract, the main purpose of which is to provide an arrangement
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for the drilling of oil ·wells.

The narrow decision of refusing

to enforce the subject provision in these circumstances need
not be the harbinger of doom for the insurance industry,
rather another example of public policy encouraging due care
and safety in
II.

haza~dous

operations.

THE STATUTORY COMPENSATION PROVIDED BY THE UTAH WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT IS THE ONLY EXPOSURE OF A COVERED
EMPLOYER TO LIABILITY FOR AN EMPLOYEE'S INJURY.
Section 35-1-60 of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

gives an injured employee the right to recover compensation
pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act from the employer.
It further provides that such compensation,
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer
. . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed
by this act shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at conunon law or otherwise, to such employee or . . . any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury
. . . incurred by such employee in the course of
. . . his employment, and no action at law may be
maintained against an employer . . . based upon
any accident, injury, or death of an employee.
(Emphasis added)
The Utah State Supreme Court has early addressed the
exclusiveness of the statutory remedy.

"Since the enactment

of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1917, the exclusive remedy
of an employee who is injured in the course of his employment
is the right to recover the compensation provided for in the
Act . . . . "

Murray v. Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah 430,

435, 274 P. 940, 942 (1929).

This Court declared that the

Act abrogates "the employee's common law right to sue the
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employer for any and all injuries suffered while in the course
of his employment, except in those cases where the employer
was not subject to the act or the common law remedy of an employee was expressly reserved by the act."

Masich v. United

States Smelting, Refining & Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191
p. 2d 612' 616

(1948) .

In its Brief, Appellant cites the Tenth Circuit case
of Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir.
1966) for the proposition that the "exclusive remedy" provision
of the Utah Act is in fact non-exclusive as to contractual
indemnity to third parties.

Since the facts set forth in

Titan appear analogous to those of the present case, the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit merits analysis.

Nevertheless, Utah

State courts do not accept rulings of Federal Courts as binding
authority for the law of this State.
2d 418

I

454 p .2d, 624

f

Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah

625 (1969) •

In Titan, the Court reviewed an action on an indemnity
agreement between an indemnitor-employer covered by the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act and a negligent indernnitee-third party
as it related to injuries suffered by an employee, and noted
that such "release-from-negligence contracts" are seen by federal
law as contrary to public policy.

The sparse Utah law upon

which the Court could rely concerned only the issue of the
validity of indemnity agreements generally.

The conflict be-

tween indemnity agreements and the exclusive remedy provision
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act had not, nor has it to

-7-
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date, been presented to the Utah State Supreme Court.

Neither

was the Tenth Circuit presented with any case from another
jurisdiction construing the exclusionary language in a Workmen's Compensation statute as forbidding enforcement of an
indemnity contract where a negligent third party would be
indemnified by the employer from all liability arising out of
the injury of a covered employee.

Therefore, absent support

to the contrary, it upheld the agreement.
Since that time, this Court has unambiguously extended
the Act's exclusive remedy provisons to preclude third-party
actions against an employer.
The exclusive remedy provisions of both the Utah
and North Carolina Workmen's Compensation provisions make it clear that an employer's only liability for injuries sustained by an employee is
the extent of benefits under the Act. Additional
exposure through the indirect method of thirdparty action would be a blatant violation of
expressed legislative policy.
Phillips v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 614 P.2d 153, 154
(Utah I 19 8 0 ) •

(Emphasis added)

Appellant has listed numerous cases in its Appendix II
which allegedly "hold that the exclusive remedy provisions of
the applicable state and federal Workmen's Compensation statutes
do not bar suits founded upon express contracts of indemnificanification."

However, a review of the respective statutes and

factual circumstances surrounding the cited authorities offer
insight into the reasoning of those other jurisdictions.

Appen-

dix A to Respondent's Brief annotates the cases cited by Appellant,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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very few of which actually uphold an express indemnity agreement.

And, those that do, concern distinguishing contractual

provisions and/or are governed by a statute which differs
materially from Utah's.
Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in
all of compensation law is the question of whether
a third party in an action by the employee can
get contribution or indemnity from the employer,
when the employer's negligence caused or contributed to the injury.
Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Law, §76.10 at 14-287.
Several jurisdictions have recently decided that the
Legislature alone should make the exceptions to the exclusivity provisions of their Workmen's Compensation Acts.

In-

deed, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota have recently amended
their statutes to expressly allow third-party indemnity agreements to be enforced against an otherwise inunune employer ..
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Rota-Cone Field Operating
Company, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (1978), New Mexico's Workmen's
Compensation Act was tested by an attempt to enforce a thirdparty indemnity agreement on facts indistinguishable from the
present case.
This case presents a question of first impression
in New Mexico.
Is an employer subject to liability
in addition to the Workmen's Compensation Act where
the employer voluntarily enters into a contract
which also seeks indemnity? We say "no."
505 P.2d at 79.

Voiding only the provisions of the contract

which relate to indemnification, the court declared the statute
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to be a prohibition of any additional liability sought to be
imposed on a covered employer.
Alabama has encountered several cases much like this
one.

In Paul Krebs & Associates v. Matthews & Fritts Construc-

tion Company, 356 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1978), the court was faced
with an indemnity clause similar to that in the Master Rotary
Drilling Contract.

There, as here, an employee of the indernni-

tor was injured on the job partially due to the negligence of
the indemnitee.

The employee was precluded from suing his em-

ployer because of the exclusivity clause of the state's Workmen's Compensation statute (similar to Utah's).

When the

employee sued the indemnitee, a third-party action was brought
against the employer.

The Alabama State Supreme Court refused

to enforce the indemnity provision and upheld the dismissal
of the third-party action stating:

"To allow a third-party

tort-feasor to recover over against the employer for injury to
an employee would be to allow indirectly what is prohibited
directly."

Id. at 639.

Overruling a prior inconsistent

decision and citing Gulf Oil Corporation v. Rota-Cone Field
Operating Company, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (1972), the
Alabama court held that its Workmen's Compensation Act compelled
the result since enforcement of the agreement would "write into
the legislation an exception which is not there."

Id. at 640.

In Hertz Equipmental Rental Corporation v. Dravo Corporation, 360 So. 2d 325 (Ala. 1978), the Alabama court again
reached the same legal conclusion, citing Paul Krebs as
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dispositive of the issue.

"The right to indemnity from Dravo

is founded on a contractual duty which is unenforceable as violation of a legislative enactment.

Most recently, that court

echoed the same policies in Stauffer Chemical Company, Inc. v.
Mcintyre Electric Service, Inc., 401 So. 2d 745 (Ala. 1981).
Michigan and Massachusetts have also recently joined
the growing number of jurisdictions which refuse to enforce
indemnity agreements in contravention of State Workmen's Compensation statutes.

In Darin & Armstrong, Inc. v. Ben Agree

Company, 276 N.W. 2d 869 (Mich. App. 1979), the court refused
to enforce the indemnity provision as void as against public
policy.

"Nor could the provision be used to indemnify

Darin & Armstrong from its concurrent negligence; this would
be akin to contribution, which is forbidden by Michigan courts
where worker's compensation is involved."

Id. at 873.

Luken v. Westermann, C.A. 70-511-M (Februar.y 23, 1972)

In
(un-

published opinion by the United States District Court in
Massachusetts) , Judge Murray refused enforcement of contractual
indemnity as violative of the
Massachusetts.

Work~en's

Compensation Act of

See, Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 442 F.Supp.

(D.R.I. 1977).
The legal positions taken by these courts are not without theoretical opposition from other jurisdictions; however,
in light of the strong legislative and judicial statements
of policy in Utah, this State has demonstrated its intent to
align itself with those jurisdictions upholding clear public
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policy over an oppressive indemnity agreement.
Respondent has complied with the Utah Act and, as an
employer, has compensated Plaintiff Back for his alleged
injuries.

The third-party action brought by Appellant for

for indemnification from Back's suit now threatens to violate
both the language and the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Additional liability is sought to be attached to

Respondent indirectly through the third-party action, yet
that liability is undeniably resultant from the accident.
This is a direct violation of the mandate of Section 35-1-60
and is incompatible with the clear interdiction of legislative policy encompassed in the Act.
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF THE UTAH COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ACT IS TO APPORTION LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGES PROPORTIONATELY TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF
EACH PARTY.
Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 of the Utah Code

Annotated (1953, as amended) are the legislative adoption of
comparative negligence in Utah.

The basic scheme of compensa-

tion diminishes total damages in a negligence action in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.

Joint tort-feasors then assume responsibility

for damages due in proportion to their "relative degrees of
fault'' causing the injury.

Thus, the clear legislative policy

of Utah is that the parties should be responsible for their
proportion of the negligent cause of injury.
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Paragraph 11.6 of the Master Rotary Drilling Contract
is plainly in contravention of the unequivocable policy in
the Utah Comparative Negligence Act.

Through this indemnity

agreement, Appellant seeks to shift all responsibility for
the alleged injury to Plaintiff Back to Respondent.

The un-

fairness and obvious violation of Utah pbulic policy is illustrated if Appellant were 99 percent at fault and Respondent
only 1 percent responsible.

Disregarding the legislative

policy, Appellant's contractual provision would make Respondent liable for 100 percent of the proven damages.
By statute, Respondent cannot be a joint tort-feasor.
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-60 (1953, as amended).

If Appellant

was negligent and its negligence constituted at least 51 percent of the total negligence as compared to Plaintiff Back,
Appellant must be held 100 percent responsible for the alleged
injuries caused by that negligence.

Respondent is statutorily

protected from all liability resulting from the accident having
fulfilled its obligations providing Back compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation statute.

This is entirely consistent

with the comparative negligence policy of making parties responsible for their own actions.

Appellant must now fulfill its

legal obligation and pay in full any proven damages caused by
its negligence as a sole tort-feasor.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The action of the lower court in granting Respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be sustained.

Based on
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the foregoing

a~alysis,

this Court should fill the void in

the State's case law concerning indemnity agreements in Workmen's Compensation actions by affirming the lower court's decision to hold the subject provision void and unenforceable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

('

day of February, 1982.

~ton

T. Richard Davis
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Respondent
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APPENDIX A

Alaska
Statute:

Alaska Stat. §23-20-055; very broad and similar
to Utah's; workmen's comp. remedy is exclusive
against anyone entitled to damages from employee's
injury.

Case:

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines,
343 F.Supp. 826 (D. Alas. 1972); Fed. court finds
no state law on subject; relies on federal
statutes to enforce indemnity agreement.

Hawaii
Statute:

Hawaii Rev. Stat. §386.5; indistinguishable
from Alaska.

Case:

Kamali v. Hawaiian
861 (Hawaii 1972) ;
express enough for
forcement possible

Electric Co., Inc., 504 P.2d
court finds contract not
enforcement; dicta says enif intent is clear enough.

Maryland
Statute:

Md. Ann Code, Art. 101, §§15, 58; workmen's
comp. remedy exclusive only to employee;
limits employee's rights, not employer's
liability.

Case:

Mason v~ Callas Contractors, Inc., 494 F.Supp.
782 (D. Md. 1980); Fed. court upholds indemnity
agreement; supports Appellant's argument.

Massachusetts (cited as Rhode Island)
Statute:

Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 152, §§15, 24; broad
replacement of civil actions by workmen's comp.;
no "exclusive" language.

Case:

Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc., 442 F.Supp. 1010
(R.I. 1977); Fed. court in Rhode Island interpreting Mass. law, rejects Mass. contrary decision and enforces indemnity agreement, see Brief
at 11.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Michigan
Statute:

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §418.131; workmen's comp.
remedy exclusive against employee; limits employee's rights, not employer's liability.

Cases:

Nanasi v. General Motors Corp., 56 Mich. App.
652, 224 N.W.2d 914 (1974); McLouth Steel Corp.
v. A. E. Adnerson Const. Corp., 48 Mich. App.
424, 210 N.W.2d 448 (1973); both cases enforcing
indemnity agreement superceded by Darin & Armstrong,
Inc. v. Ben Agree Company, 276 N.W.2d 869 (Mich.
App. 1979), see Brief at 11.

Minnesota
Statute:

Minn. Stat. Ann. §176.061(10); expressly allows
written indemnity contracts.

Case:

Irrelevant because of statute.

Montana
Statute:

Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§92-203 and 204; broad
all encompassing "exclusive" remedy language.

Case:

DeSlaw v. Johnson, 472 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1970);
court upholds contract which indemnifies only
employer's negligence.

Ohio
Statute:

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4123.74; broad language
similar to Utah restricts employer's liability.

Case:

Williams v. Ashland Chemical Co., 52 Ohio App.
2d 81, 368 N.W.2d 304 (1976); Dicta states that
enforcement of indemnity contract is possible.

Okalhoma
Statute:

Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 85, §12; very broad language similar to Utah.

Case:

Harter Concrete Products, Inc. v. Harris, 592
P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979); Dicta states that indemnity based on independent legal relationship may
be enforced.
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Oregon
Statute:

Or. Rev. Stat. §656.018(1); broad language similar to Utah.

Cases:

Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co.,
539 P.2d 1059 (ore. 1975); United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co.,
Inc., 539 P.2d 1065 (Ore. 1975); both cases declare indemnity agreements enforceable in workmen's comp. cases, Kaiser in dicta.

Pennsylvania
Statute:

77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §48l(b); expressly allows
written indemnity contracts.

Case:

Irrelevant because of statute.

Texas
Statute:

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 8306, §3; expressly
alows written indemnity contracts.

Cases:

Irrelevant becuase of statute.

Vermont
Statute:

Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 21, §622; limits employee's
rights, not employer's liability.

Case:

New England T&T Company v. Central Vermont Public
Service Corp., 391 F.Supp. 420 (D. Vt. 1975);
Fed. court admits no state law on subject; follows
other Fed. courts' decisions enforcing agreements.

Virginia
Statute:

Va. Code §65.1-40; limits employee's rights, not
employer's liability.

Case:

Burnette v. General Electric Co., 389 F.Supp.
1317 (W.D. Va. 1975); Fed. court finds no state
law on subject; follows other Fed. courts enforcing
agreements.

Washington
Statute:

Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. §§51.04.010 and 51.32.010;
limits employee's rights, not employer's liability.
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Cases:

Redford v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 198, 615
P.2d 1285 (1980); Calkins v. Lorain Division of
Koehring Co., 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143
(1980); Broxson v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific R. Co., 446 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1971);
Redford and Broxson uphold agreements indemnifying
only employer's negligence; Calkins took great
pains to avoid enforcing agreement while declaring
indemnity possible.

Wisconsin
Statute:

Wisc. Stat. §102.03(2); vague declaration of
"exclusive remedy against employer."

Cases:

Hintz v. Darling Freight, Inc., 17 Wis.2d 376,
117 N.W.2d 271 (1962).; Huck v. Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 124, 92
N.W.2d 349 (1958); Hintz allowed agreement indemnifying only employer's negligence; Huck did not
discuss workmen's comp.

Wyoming
Statute:

Wyo. Stat. §27-50; limits employee's rights, not
employer's liability.

Cases:

Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co. v. American Surety
Conpany of New York, 365 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.
1966); Pan American Petroleum v. Maddux Well
Service, 586 P.2d 1220 (Wyo. 1979); Pitts Fed.
court finds no state law and enforces agreement
indemnifying aonly employer's negligence; Maddux
avoided enforcing that agreement, but declared
inde~nity possible.
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I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
Brief to be mailed to Chris Wangsgard and Jeffrey C. Collins
of Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main, Suite
1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, this

/&

day of February,

1982.
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